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IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The ruling of the Court of Appeals denies the DeBrys due 
process of law. 
2. The decision of the Court of Appeals reverses the policy 
of this Court to construe pleadings to allow a case to be heard on 
its merits. 
3. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals encourages litigants 
to disregard procedural rules and requirements. 
4. Construction of the DeBrys1 Rule 4-504 objections to the 
form of proposed findings as a Rule 52(b) motion denies to the 
DeBrys their right to an appeal guaranteed by Art. VIII, § 5 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
V. 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
This case is reported as DeBry v. Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Co., 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992) (a copy of 
the Opinion in found in the Appendix, Ex. C.) 
VI. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on March 18, 1992. The 
Court of Appeals filed its order denying appellants' Petition for 
Rehearing on April 24, 1992. This court signed an order dated May 
12, 1992 extending the date for filing a petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to June 23, 1992. 
1 
This court has jurisdiction to grant certiorari pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the trial court, the DeBrys filed a pleading titled "Plain-
tiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" as allowed by Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration2 (See Exhibit D). 
If that pleading (Exhibit D) is interpreted to be objections 
to a proposed order [as it is titled and as allowed by Rule 4-
504(2)], the DeBrys' notice of appeal was timely filed and the 
Court of Appeals should have exercised jurisdiction to hear the 
DeBrys' appeal on its merits. However, if that pleading (Exhibit 
D) is interpreted to be a Rule 52(b) motion to amend an existing 
order3(contrary to the caption and substance of the pleading) ; then 
the DeBrys' notice of appeal was prematurely filed and the Court of 
2Rule 4-504(2) provides: copies of the proposed findings, 
judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the 
court and counsel within five days of service. (Emphasis added.) 
3Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Upon 
motion of a party made no later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be 
made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a 
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the district court an objection of 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
2 
Appeals had a legal basis to dismiss the DeBrys1 appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. See. Facts Section below. 
VIII. 
FACTS 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Company ("Fidelity") and 
certified the case for appeal under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. 
Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand 
delivered proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg-
ment to the DeBrys1 counsel. (See Exhibit E, Appendix). 
On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to all other 
counsel in the case. (Exhibit F, Appendix). 
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings and 
judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit G, Appendix). 
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys1 counsel filed objections to the 
form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed 
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed 
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit H, Appendix). For the next seven 
months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot 
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b) 
Motion. See Point III, infra. 
Approximately seven months later, Fidelity, ex parte, obtained 
the signature of the trial court on an order which purported to 
3 
deny a Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend the May 2, 1990 Judg-
ment. (Exhibit I, Appendix). 
Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990 order, 
(Exhibit E) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal. 
Eight months later when Fidelity filed its brief in the Court 
of Appeals, it (for the first time) claimed that the Court of 
Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys1 appeal on its 
merits because there was no notice of appeal filed following entry 
of the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit E). See Appellees1 Brief 
filed in the Court of Appeals at Point I. (Exhibit J, Appendix.) 
The Court of Appeals accepted Fidelity's argument and dis-
missed the appeal without reaching the merits. DeBry v. Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Company, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. 
1992) . (Exhibit C.) 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CERTIORARI IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENT OF 
THIS COURT AS SET OUT IN THE RECENT CASE OF 
GALLARDO V. BOLINDER4 
This Court has recently given the Court of Appeals specific 
instructions on how to analyse motions: 
[I]f the nature of the motion can be ascer-
tained from the substance of the instrument, 
we have heretofore held that an improper 
caption is not fatal to the motion Gallardo v. 
Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990). 
(Emphasis added.) 
4800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990). 
4 
The problem in this case is that the Court of Appeals did not 
look to the substance of the motion or even its caption; rather, 
the Court of Appeals looked only at the calendar to reach its 
decision. 
If the Court of Appeals had looked at the substance of the 
motion, the Court of Appeals would have found: 
1. Nowhere is Rule 52(b) or Rule 59(e) mentioned. 
2. The title of the pleading states: "Plaintiffs1 Objections 
and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
3. The introductory paragraph of the pleading states: 
"Plaintiffs submit the following objections and additions to the 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. . . . " See, p. 
1, Exhibit D. 
4. The title to the first section of the pleading states: 
"General Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact." See, p. 1, 
Exhibit D. 
5. The title to the second section of the pleading states: 
"Specific Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact." See, p. 2, 
Exhibit D. 
6. The first sentence of the second section of the pleading 
states: "Without waiving the general objection just mentioned, the 
plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the proposed 
Findings of Fact." See, p. 2, Exhibit D. 
7. The second sentence of section two of the pleading 
states: "By making these specific objections, the plaintiffs do not 
5 
intend to resubmit or reargue their opposition to Fidelity's 
motion." See, p. 2, Exhibit D. 
8. Plaintiffs' first objection stated: "Regarding finding 
number 1, plaintiffs object to the language 'under construction' on 
the third line." See, p. 3, Exhibit D. 
9. Plaintiffs' second objection stated: "The comments to 
number 1 above would apply." See, p. 3, Exhibit D. 
10. Plaintiffs' third objection stated: "With respect to 
finding number 4, plaintiffs object to the characterization by 
defendant. . . . " See, p. 3, Exhibit D. 
11. Plaintiffs' fourth objection stated: "Plaintiffs object 
to finding number 5 on the grounds the court made no findings. . ." 
See, p. 3, Exhibit D. 
12. Plaintiffs' fifth objection stated: "Plaintiffs object 
to the characterization of the escrow agreement's meaning." See, 
p. 3, Exhibit D. 
13. Plaintiffs' sixth objection stated: "Plaintiffs object 
to the characterization of the letter. . ." See, p. 3, Exhibit D. 
14. The title to the third section of the pleading states: 
"Objections to proposed conclusions of law." See, p. 4, Exhibit D. 
15. The first sentence of section 3 states: "The proposed 
conclusions of law contain unnecessary and inappropriate restate-
ment of the facts. . . . " See, page 4, Exhibit D. 
16. The pleading asks for no relief.5 
5The fact plaintiffs' pleading asked for no relief creates a 
compelling argument against construing the "objections" as a Rule 
52(b) motion since Rule 7(b)(1), U.R.C.P. defines a motion as "an 
6 
17 • The pleading does not ask the court to alter or amend an 
existing Judgment.6 
Rather than examining the substance of the pleading (Exhibit 
D) or its title, the Court of Appeals looked only to the calendar. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion 
filed within ten days of the entry of Judgment 
that questions the correctness of the court's 
findings and conclusions is properly treated 
as a post-judgment motion under either Rules 
52 (b) or 59(e). 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 52. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The effect of this deference to form over substance is to 
magically transform a simple pre-judgment Rule 4-504(2) objection 
(which may have been filed late) into a post judgment motion to 
amend under Rule 52(b) or 59(e). Such a result is contrary to the 
spirit of Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, 
Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988); Foman v. Davis, 371 
U.S. 178 (1962). 
In summary, the Court of Appeals did not follow Gallardo v. 
Bolinder supra, which instructs the Court of Appeals to look to the 
substance of DeBrys1 pleading. Instead, the Court of Appeals 
resolved the jurisdictional issue by merely looking at a calendar. 
application for an order" which "shall set forth the relief or 
order sought". Since DeBrys1 objections ask for no relief, by 
definition it is not a motion". 
6The whole purpose of Rule 52(b) is to bring before the Court 
a request to modify an existing entered Judgment. Objections filed 
pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) have no relation to motions under Rule 
52(b). 
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POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE 
REVERSES THE LONGSTANDING POLICY OF THIS COURT TO 
CONSTRUE PLEADINGS IN FAVOR OF JURISDICTION SO 
CASES CAN BE HEARD ON THEIR MERITS 
A review of cases decided by this Court in recent years estab-
lishes two sound policies. They are: 
1. Cases should be determined on their merits, e.g. Gallardo 
v, Bolinder, supra; Dixon v. Stoddard, supra; Nelson v. Stoker. 669 
P.2d 390 (Utah 1983); and 
2. Where possible, pleadings are construed to support juris-
diction and the intent of the filing party. E.g.. Gallardo v. 
Bolinder, supra; Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 
(1960); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983). 
These policies parallel the holdings of the federal courts. 
The Supreme Court has stated in United States v. Hougham, 3 64 U.S. 
310 (1960): 
The Federal Rules reject the approach that 
pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the 
outcome and accept the principle that the 
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper 
decision on the merits. 364 U.S. at 317. 
See, Foman v. Davis. 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). 
Relying upon the basic premise that courts should decide cases 
on the merits, courts often overlook procedural defects to get to 
the merits of the litigants1 dispute. E.g., American Air Filter 
Co. v. Industrial Decking and Roofing Corp., 82 F.R.D. 681 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1979); Turner v. McClain, 459 F.Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1978); 
8 
Pes Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1955). In Pes Isles. 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
The rules have for their primary purpose the 
securing of speedy and inexpensive justice in 
a uniform and well ordered manner; they were 
not adopted to set traps and pitfalls by way 
of technicalities for unwary litigants. 225 
F.2d at 236. 
See, Gonzales v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 385 F.Supp. 140, 145 
(P. Puerto Rico 1974). 
The court in Turner v. McClain, supra, states: 
In general, the rules and statutes should be 
interpreted to produce decisions disposing of 
claims on their merits. Substantial justice 
is the end purpose of the process. . .459 
F.Supp. at 902. 
In Vreeken v. Pavis. 718 F.2d 343 (10 Cir. 1983) the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a trial court order, which 
construed a pleading denominated as a Rule 60(b) motion to be a 
Rule 59 motion, so as to allow an appeal to proceed on its merits. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that Rule l7 allows the 
court to proceed to the merits of an appeal where strict compliance 
with the rules has not occurred. Pixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 
(Utah 1988). 
This Court has previously construed a pleading to be other 
than what is stated in its caption to support appellate juris-
diction, Gallardo v. Bolinder, supra; Nelson v. Stoker, supra; 
Howard v. Howard, supra; but never the converse. In fact, in 
7Rule 1, U.R.C.P. provides in part: "These rules shall govern 
the procedure. . . in all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil 
nature. . . They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." 
9 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, supra, this court summarily reversed a ruling 
of the Court of Appeals which refused to consider the intent of the 
parties which supported a conclusion that the appeal had been 
timely filed. Similar action is warranted in this case. 
POINT III 
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ENCOURAGES 
BLATANT DISREGARD OF PROCEDURAL RULES 
As stated in Point II, supra, the DeBrys filed objections to 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [pursuant to Rule 
4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.] Arguably, 
the DeBrys1 "objections" were filed late. (See, Facts Section, 
supra.) However, if the DeBrys1 objections were in fact late, the 
DeBrys were led into the trap of filing late because of Fidelity's 
numerous procedural violations. 
Seven months after the Notice of Appeal was filed in this 
case, Fidelity, with blatant disregard of the applicable procedural 
rules, submitted an order to Judge Brian which characterized the 
DeBrys1 "Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" as a Rule 52(b) motion. (See Exhibit E). In 
violation of procedural rules, Judge Brian signed the order. Being 
unaware such an order had been signed, the DeBrys did not file a 
new Notice of Appeal. In a pronounced departure from prior rulings 
of this court,8 the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court 
could properly construe objections filed under Rule 4-504, Utah 
See argument at Point II., supra. 
10 
Code of Judicial Administration, as a Rule 52(b) motion. DeBry v. 
Fidelity, supra. 
The net result of this ruling is to reward Fidelity for its 
ingenious string of procedural rules violations. The course of 
Fidelity's rules violations were as follows: 
1. Violation of Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides in part: 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
Following summary judgment, Fidelity submitted findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to support the summary judgment. This 
was a violation of Rule 52(a) because findings and conclusions are 
not proper or necessary to support summary judgment. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright, & Miles, 681 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). This uncalled for submission triggered 
plaintiff to file objections to the findings, conclusions and order 
pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. (Ex. D.) 
2. Violations of Rule 4-504(2) Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration and Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4-504(2) provides: 
Copies of the proposed findings,judgments, and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel 
before being presented to the court for 
signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the 
court and counsel within five days after 
service. 
11 
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defines the 
method of calculating the time allowed to carry out requirements of 
the Rules.9 
Fidelity violated these rules as follows: The proposed 
findings, conclusions and judgment were hand delivered to plaintiff 
April 24, 1990 (Exhibit E) . They were mailed to all other counsel 
April 25, 1990 (Exhibit F). The mailing certificate (Exhibit F) 
was attached to the proposed findings (Exhibit E) and delivered to 
the DeBrys. This created some confusion as to when objections were 
due. Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), using Rule 6 time computations, 
the last day on which counsel could file objections to the form of 
the proposed judgment was May 7, 1992.10 Fidelity submitted the 
order for signature 5 days early in violation of Rule 4-504(2) and 
Rule 6. The judge signed the order (Exhibit G) 5 days prior to 
expiration of the time allowed for objections. 
Plaintiffs1 counsel prepared and signed objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 4, 1990 and they 
9Rule 4-504 allows 5 days to object to the form of a proposed 
order. In calculating the 5 days, Rule 6(a) U.R.C.P. provides you 
do not count Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. Where copies of a 
proposed order are served by mail, as they were in this case, (see 
Exhibit F, appendix), Rule 6(e) adds 3 more days. Where the last 
filing day is a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, Rule 6(a) extends the 
last day for filing to the next business day. 
10Fidelity mailed the judgment to counsel on April 25, 1990 
(Exhibit E). Five days under Rule 6(a) would make objections due 
on Wednesday, May 2, 1990(the day Judge Brian actually signed the 
order, see Exhibit G) . However, Rule 6(e) adds three days for mail 
service which allows for objections until Saturday, May 5, 1990. 
Since Rule 6(a) moves the due date from a Saturday to the following 
Monday, the last day for objections would have been May 7, 1990, 
the date DeBrys filed their objections. 
12 
were filed on Monday, May 7, 1990. (Exhibit D.) Even though the 
DeBrys' objections were technically filed late because Fidelity 
sent the DeBrys1 copy by hand delivery, if Fidelity had not 
violated procedural rules and submitted the order early, the 
DeBrys1 objections would have been filed prior to signing of the 
judgment and no question would have arisen as to whether the 
DeBrys1 objections were a Rule 52(b) motion. The confusion as to 
the form of the DeBrys1 objections was caused by Fidelity's rules 
violations in submitting the order early for signature. 
3. Violation of Rule 4-504(4) Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-504(4) provides: 
Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judg-
ment shall be served upon the opposing party 
and proof of such service shall be filed with 
the court. All judgments, orders, and 
decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be 
transmitted after signature by the judge, 
including other correspondence requiring a 
reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed 
envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows: 
No notice of entry of judgment was sent to anyone by Fidelity. 
When the DeBrys objections under Rule 4-504(2) were filed on May 7, 
1990, counsel was unaware of the May 2, signing of the judgment. 
When it was discovered that the judgment had been filed May 2, 
1990, counsel assumed the Rule 4-504(2) objections were moot11 and 
filed a notice of appeal. 
nA pleading filed out of time has no force or effect. See, 
Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1988). 
13 
4. Violation of Rule 4-501(1) (b) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides: 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If 
the responding party fails to file a memoran-
dum in opposition to a motion within ten days 
after service of the motion, the moving party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to 
the court for decision as provided in para-
graph (1)(d) of this rule. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
If in fact the DeBrys1 objections (Exhibit D) were a Rule 
52(b) motion which was opposed by Fidelity, Rule 4-501(1)(b) 
requires a response in opposition within ten days. Fidelity never 
responded. When Fidelity failed to file a written response, it 
waived any right to submit the motion for decision. Violation of 
this rule denied the DeBrys notice that Fidelity thought a Rule 
52(b) motion was pending or that Fidelity opposed such a motion. 
5. Violation of Rule 4-501(1)(d). 
Rule 4-501(1)(d), Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
provides: 
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to 
file a reply memorandum, either party may 
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the 
court for decision. The notification shall be 
in the form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The notification shall contain a certificate 
of mailing to all parties. If neither party 
files a notice, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. 
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows: 
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Assuming, arguendo, that a Rule 52(b) motion was pending, if 
Fidelity wanted a ruling, Rule 4-501(1)(d) requires a notice to 
submit for decision. Even if we assume Fidelity's violation of 
Rule 4-501(1)(b) did not preclude Fidelity from submitting the 
motion for decision, Fidelity never complied with Rule 4-501(1)(d) 
and thereby denied notice to the DeBrys that Fidelity thought a 
Rule 52(b) motion was pending or under consideration. The rule 
provides that if a notice to submit is not filed, then "the motion 
will not be submitted for decision." Counsel has a right to assume 
that no ruling will be made or order entered unless submitted for 
decision pursuant to rule 4-501(1)(d). 
A party who does not submit an opposition memorandum cannot 
submit the motion for decision.12 Fidelity had no right to submit 
the DeBrys1 Rule 4-504 objections for decision as a Rule 52(b) 
motion because Fidelity never filed an opposing memorandum pursuant 
to rule 4-501(1)(b). 
However, even if we assume Fidelity had a right to submit the 
matter for decision, Fidelity's failure to comply with Rule 
4-501(1)(d) by submitting a "Notice to Submit for Decision" with a 
copy served on counsel for the DeBrys, denied notice to DeBrys that 
12Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides that if no opposition memorandum is 
filed the moving party may submit the matter for decision. No 
provision is made for submission by the responding party where no 
opposition memorandum has been filed. Rule 4-501(1)(d), which 
allows either party to submit the motion for decision, comes into 
play only following filing of a reply memorandum. A reply 
memorandum is filed under Rule 4-501(1) (c) only when the responding 
party has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion under Rule 
4-501(1)(b). Thus, a party who files no opposition to a pending 
motion has no right under Rule 4-501(1) to submit a pending motion 
for decision. 
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Fidelity: (1) considered the DeBrys1 objections to be a Rule 52(b) 
motion; and (2) that Fidelity was asking the court to rule on the 
supposed pending motion. 
6. Violations of Rule 4-504(1). 
Rule 4-504(1) provides: 
In all rulings by a court, counsel for the 
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen days, or within a shorter time 
as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment, or decree in con-
formity with the ruling. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
Rule 4-504(1) allows submission of a proposed order only after a 
ruling of the court. Fidelity violated this rule when it submitted 
the December 11, 1990 order for signature. There had been no 
ruling from the court and no request for a ruling had been filed. 
The previous rules violations had denied notice to the DeBrys that 
Fidelity thought there was an unresolved motion. If the DeBrys had 
been put on such notice, they would have been aware that Fidelity 
thought there was a Rule 52(b) motion underway and upon conclusion 
of the resolution process under Rules 4-501 and 4-504, the DeBrys 
could have then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
7. Additional Violation of Rule 4-504(4). 
In addition to the violation of Rule 4-504(4) set forth in 
paragraph 3 above, Fidelity again violated Rule 4-504(4) as 
follows: 
Having obtained a signature on the December 11, 1990 order in 
violation of procedural rules as set forth above, Fidelity again 
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violated rule 4-504(4) by not notifying the DeBrys of entry of the 
order. This denied to the DeBrys a notice which would have 
triggered the duty to file a new notice of appeal, which would have 
then avoided dismissal of the appeal. 
Fidelity's rules violations denied to the DeBrys three 
specific notices which would have alerted the DeBrys that a problem 
existed regarding the Rule 4-504 objections which the DeBrys had 
thought were mooted by signing of the judgment from which the 
DeBrys appealed in this case. These additional notices would have 
precluded entry of the December 11 order without the DeBrys1 
knowledge and the DeBrys1 appeal rights could have been timely 
protected so that a decision on the merits could have been rendered 
in this case. 
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to enter orders 
in violation of procedural rules. Schleininq v. Estate of Morris, 
431 P.2d 464 (Colo. 1967) (en banc). Procedural rules are enacted 
to provide a pattern of regularity in the practice of law which can 
be relied upon by litigants and their counsel. Drury v. Lunceford, 
18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). 
POINT IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REQUIRE THIS COURT TO EXAMINE 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE 
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case raises 
questions as to whether the DeBrys were denied due process of law. 
In Llovd v. Third Judicial District Court. 27 Utah 2d 322, 495 
P.2d 1262 (1970), the Supreme Court defined due process of law as: 
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[A] course of legal proceedings according to 
those rules and principles which have been 
established in our systems of jurisprudence 
for the enforcement and protection of private 
rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324. 
Due process of law requires that a litigant be given his day 
in court in compliance with established procedural rules. See, 
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894); Llovd v. Third Judicial 
District Court, supra; Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 
662 (1966); Mavland v. State, 568 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 1977). 
A party has a right to rely on the parties to the litigation 
following procedural rules. Drury v. Luncefordf 18 Utah 2d at 76. 
In Drury this court stated that procedural rules: 
[A]re to be liberally construed to effectuate 
justice, nevertheless, they were designed to 
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure 
which the parties and the courts could follow 
and rely upon. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Procedural rules cannot be changed at the whim of the court or 
a party. Mayland v. State, supra. The disregard of procedural 
rules by a trial court cannot be countenanced. Mesa v. Washington 
State Department of Social and Health Services, 683 F.2d 314 (9th 
Cir. 1982). Appellate courts routinely reverse trial court rulings 
where procedural rules have been ignored or violated. E.g., Conner 
v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810 (1982) 
review den. 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982); Armstrong v. Lake, 447 N.E.2d 
1153, 1154 (Ind. App. 1983); State v. Turner, 10 Ohio App.3d 328, 
462 N.E.2d 1250 (1983); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain, 442 P.2d 
187 (Colo. 1968); Schleining v. Estate of Morris, 431 P.2d 464 
(Colo. 1967) (en banc); Thomas v. Children's Hospital Ass'n, 535 
18 
P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1975); Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211 (Colo. 
App. 1983). 
A party has a right to rely on application of the Rules as 
written and the court has a duty to enforce the rules as written. 
E.g. , Drury v. Lunceford, supra; Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 
supra; Motz v. Jammaron, supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance 
Co., supra. Due process of law requires following the regular 
course of proceedings. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901). 
In addition to the Due Process consideration, the DeBrys have 
a constitutional right to have the district court decision reviewed 
on its merits. Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5. The right to an appeal 
is a valuable constitutional right. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). Utah's constitution provides: 
The district court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to 
issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all 
other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for 
matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal 
of right from the court of original juris-
diction to a court with appellate jurisdiction 
over the cause. Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5. 
In good faith, the DeBrys1 followed the procedural steps 
necessary to appeal the summary judgment issued by the district 
court. As shown in Point III, supra, Fidelity's procedural 
violations created a procedural trap wherein the Court of Appeals 
ultimately refused to hear the DeBrys' appeal on its merits. 
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The effect of the ruling of the Court of Appeals, as argued 
herein, is to deny the DeBrys their Constitutional Right to have 
their appeal heard on its merits, in violation of Art. VIII, § 5 of 
the Utah Constition and, for that reason, the ruling of the Court 
of Appeals should be reversed. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
Fidelity's numerous procedural omissions and violations set in 
motion a series of events which created a confused procedural 
setting. The confusion generated by Fidelity's acts resulted in 
dismissal of the appeal in this case on a procedural technicality. 
Rule 46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
for granting a Writ of Certiorari "when a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a way 
that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." The 
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case conflicts with 
Supreme Court decisions as argued herein. This court should grant 
certiorari to correct the error of the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this <^,J> day of June, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EXHIBIT A 
459 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Art. VIII, § 13 
Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of 
any cause. 1984 
Sec. 4. (Rule-making power of Supreme Court 
— Judges pro tempore — Regulation 
of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and 
shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Leg-
islature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legis-
lature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize re-
tired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court 
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and disci-
pline of persons admitted to practice law. 1984 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other 
courts — Right of appeal.! 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or 
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided 
by statute. Except for matters filed originally with 
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all eases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction 
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
1984 
S e c . 6. [Number of j u d g e s of distr ict court and 
o ther cour t s — Divis ions . ] 
The number of judges of the district court and of 
other courts of record established by the Legislature 
shall be provided by statute. No change in the num-
ber of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge 
from office during a judge's term of office. Geographic 
divisions for all courts of record except the Supreme 
Court may be provided by statute. No change in divi-
sions shall have the effect of removing a judge from 
office during a judge's term of office. 1984 
S e c . 7. [Qual i f icat ions of jus t i ce s a n d judges . ] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years 
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five 
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice 
law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be 
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah 
residents for three years preceding selection, and ad-
mitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divi-
sions are provided for any court, judges of that court 
shall reside in the geographic division for which they 
are selected. 1984 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions 
— Senate approval.] 
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the 
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a 
list of at least three nominees certified to the gover-
nor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having 
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill 
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of 
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy 
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the ap-
pointment from the list of nominees. The Legislature 
by statute shall provide for the nominating commis-
sions' composition and procedures. No member of the 
Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the 
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nomi-
nating Commission. The Senate shall consider and 
render a decision on each judicial appointment within 
30 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the 
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session 
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments. 
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a 
majority of all members of the Senate. If the Senate 
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be 
considered vacant and a new nominating process 
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based 
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without 
regard to any partisan political considerations. 1984 
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elections.] 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject 
to an unopposed retention election at the first general 
election held more than three years after appoint-
ment. Following initial voter approval, each Supreme 
Court justice every tenth year, and each judge of 
other courts of record every sixth year, shall be sub-
ject to an unopposed retention election at the corre-
sponding general election. Judicial retention elec-
tions shall be held on a nonpartisan ballot in a man-
ner provided by statute. If geographic divisions are 
provided for any court of record, the judges of those 
courts shall stand for retention election only in the 
geographic division to which they are selected. 1984 
Sec. 10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.) 
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and 
judges of all other courts of record while holding office 
may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial 
public office, or hold office in a political party. 1984 
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record.] 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a 
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided 
by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed 
which requires judges of courts not of record to be 
admitted to practice law. The number of judges of 
courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 1984 
Sec. 12. [Judicial Council — Chief justice as ad-
ministrative officer.] 
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt 
rules for the administration of the courts of the state. 
The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court, as presiding officer, and such 
other justices, judges, and other persons as provided 
by statute. There shall be at least one representative 
on the Judicial Council from each court established 
by the constitution or by statute. The chief justice of 
the Supreme Court shall be the chief administrative 
officer for the courts and shall implement the rules 
adopted by the Judicial Council. 1984 
Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.} 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established 
which shall investigate and conduct confidential 
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or 
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the 
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repri-
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary 
retirement of any justice or judge for the following: 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct 
in office; 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a 
felony under state or federal law; 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform ju-
dicial duties; 
279 JUDICIAL CODE 78-2-4 
Section 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-3. Repealed. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7. Repealed. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief jus-
tice and associate chief justice — Se-
lection and functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be ap-
pointed initially to serve until the first general elec-
tion held more than three years after the effective 
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office 
of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and 
commences on the first Monday in January following 
the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a 
successor is appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a 
chief justice from among the members of the court by 
a majority vote of all justices. The term of the office of 
chief justice is four years. The chief justice may serve 
successive terms. The chief justice may resign from 
the office of chief justice without resigning from the 
Supreme Court. The chief justice may be removed 
from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice 
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the asso-
ciate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a 
chief justice is elected under this section. If the asso-
ciate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as 
chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this sec-
tion. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a 
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has 
duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief jus-
tice. The term of office of the associate chief justice is 
two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The 
associate chief justice shall be elected by a majority 
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If 
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities 
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law. 
1990 
7&2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971,1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
&e United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
*sue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
dl writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
ion. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
Qcluding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a iudmwAnt nf tk<> r™~*- ~e A 1-
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) 
through (0. 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1989 
78-2-3. Repealed. i9se 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
EXHIBIT B 
OPERATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-501 
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions and renumbered the remaining subdivisions 
(5)(C) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for accordingly, making appropriate reference 
"court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "pre- changes throughout; in present Subdivision 
siding judge" for "court" in two places m Subdi- (3), deleted "audited" before "financial state-
vision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "Feb- ment" and substituted "surety" for "company" 
ruary 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivi- in the first sentence and substituted "the 
sion (7); and made stylistic changes through- value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of 
out. credit dollars" in the second sentence; in 
The 1990 amendment, in Subdivision (1) present Subdivision (5), substituted "current 
added "or if the statement is made on behalf of assets" for "real assets" in two places; and re-
a business or corporation, a statement that the wrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table 
business or corporation" to the introductory setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstand-
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic ing to net worth value, 
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete Ian- The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer-
guage relating to appraisals and inserted "pre- cial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading, 
pared by a certified public accountant"; redes- inserted "re-qualification and disqualification" 
ignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present and "commercial" in the Intent section, and 
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4), substantially rewrote the rule. 
Rule 4-408, Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
nated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar 
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any 
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this 
rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
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partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- the proposed order" following "supporting doc-
ment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a umentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
detailed description is impracticable. lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of in Subdivision (3)(b). 
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Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small 
claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint 
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
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(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court, 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agree-
ment which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- The 1991 amendment added the final sen-
ment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "ex- tence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not 
cept small claims" under "Applicability" and of record" following "courts of record" in the 
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivi-
of the Rule. sion (10). 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support 
of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must be filed with 
the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of 
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute 
the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage 
for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the 
fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than 
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed. 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is 
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT 
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING 
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL 
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they 
conform to the provisions of this rule and to state statute and case law. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- (2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision 
ment inserted "be filed with the court and" in (1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivi-
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision sion designation and the phrase beginning 
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements "and" at the end. 
other than hourly rates, added the designation 
973 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 47 
TITLE VII. 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with 
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the 
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party 
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to 
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket 
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file 
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certio-
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rari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari 
which shall comply in all respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then 
be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve 
four copies of the cross-petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all 
parties in the case of the date of the filing and of the certiorari docket number 
of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. A cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other filing; the 
clerk shall not accept any filing so joined. 
(d) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be 
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of 
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of 
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party 
noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with 
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition. 
(e) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party in-
tending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any 
time prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion 
for an order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial 
court certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to 
the Supreme Court. Motions to certify the record prior to action on the peti-
tion by the Supreme Court should rarely be made, only when the record is 
essential to the Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the 
brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived from the con-
tents of the petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix. If a 
motion is appropriate, it shall be made to the Supreme Court after the filing of 
a petition but prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case 
of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion 
may be made before the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court or any party to the case may request that additional parts of 
the record be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court. Copies of all 
motions for certification and transmission shall be sent to the parties to the 
proceeding. All motions and orders shall comply with and be subject to the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the 
decision by the Court of Appeals. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictional^ out of time. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of 
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a 
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the 
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial 
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehear-
ing. 
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(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule; 
or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of 
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certio-
rari of another party to the case is granted. 
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after 
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, 
whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of 
the prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise 
requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the 
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed 
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
indicated: 
( D A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Su-
preme Court contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious. General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The 
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every sub-
sidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in 
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme 
Court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and 
487 
Rule 49 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by a writ of 
certiorari. 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving 
the appropriate citation. If the controlling provisions involved are 
lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent 
text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph (10) of 
this paragraph. 
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in 
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record and to 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argu-
ment explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 46 
for the issuance of the writ. 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order: 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be re-
viewed; 
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in 
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by 
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions pre-
sented. Each document shall include the caption showing the name of 
the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the case, and the 
date of its entry; and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are 
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case 
that is the subject of the petition. 
If the material that is required by subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this para-
graph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented. 
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The cover of the petition shall be 
white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and if a petition is 
not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and this paragraph, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in subpara-
graph (a)(9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a 
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. 
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as 
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph (a)(7) of 
this rule, and the appendix. 
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
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and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
Rule 50, Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days after service of 
a petition in which to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter 
or ground why the case should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Such 
brief shall comply with the requirements of Rule 49, as applicable, and comply 
with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The cover of the brief shall be 
orange. The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not 
prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and with the proper cover, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and 
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the 
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 49(a)(7), and 
the appendix. 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the 
brief in opposition. 
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, 
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk for consider-
ation. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed, distri-
bution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be delayed until 
the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the expiration of the 
time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file. 
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the 
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under 
paragraph (d) of this rule will not be delayed pending the filing of any such 
brief. Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. 
Such brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The 
cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all briefs before 
filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and with the 
proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies shall be served as pre-
scribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately represented. 
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the Supreme Court 
granted on motion, or at the request of the Supreme Court. A motion for leave 
shall identify the interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a 
brief of an amicus curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, 
an amicus curiae shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose 
position it will support, unless the Supreme Court for cause shown shall grant 
leave for later filing, in which event it shall specify within what period an 
opposing party may answer. Such brief shall comply with the requirements of 
Rule 49, as applicable, and comply with the form of briefs as specified in Rule 
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27. The cover of the brief shall be green. The brief may not exceed 20 pages, 
excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations 
required by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix. Ten copies of the brief shall be 
filed, and four copies shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for 
each party separately represented. 
Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents dis-
tributed pursuant to Rule 50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying 
the petition or granting the petition in whole or in part. The order shall be 
decided summarily, shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a 
decision on the merits. 
(b) Grant of petition. Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is entered, the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of record. The case then will 
stand for briefing and oral argument. If the record has not previously been 
filed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall request the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals to certify it and transmit it to the Supreme Court. A formal writ shall 
not issue unless specially directed. 
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is de-
nied, an order to that effect will be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of record. 
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RULE 
71 A. Process in behalf of and against persons 
not parties. 
7IB. Proceedings where parties not sum-
moned. 
PART IX. APPEALS. 
72 through 76. [Repealed.] 
PART X. DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS. 
77. District courts and clerks. 
RULE 
78 to 80. [Repealed.] 
PART XL GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
81. Applicability of rules in general. 
82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected. 
83. [Repealed.] 
84. Forms. 
85. Title. 
APPENDIX OF FORMS. 
INDEX TO RULES. 
PART L 
SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION. 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the Supreme 
Court, the district courts, the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state 
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cogni-
zable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as 
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legisla-
ture and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. 
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also 
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in 
the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when 
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which 
event the former procedure applies. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F.R.C.P., 
except that it has been adapted to procedure of 
this state. 
Cross-References. — Children's cases 
deemed civil proceedings, § 78-3a-44. 
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected 
by rules, Rule 82. 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district 
courts, circuit courts, and justice courts, Chap-
ters 2, 2a, 3, 4, 5 of Title 78. 
Supreme Court's rulemaking power, § 78-2-
4. 
United States, execution of process on land 
acquired by, §§ 63-8-1, 63-8-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
—Administrative body. 
Federal rules. 
Noncompliance. 
Cited. 
Applicability. 
—Administrative body. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply to a proceeding before an administrative 
body seeking to regulate activities burdened 
with a public interest. Entre Nous Club v. 
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955). 
Federal rules. 
Since these rules were fashioned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to 
examine decisions under the federal rules to 
determine the meanings thereof. Winegar v. 
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205 
(1953) (construing Rule 41). 
Noncompliance. 
Noncompliance with ] 
when some inadvertent 
neglect, or mistake has o 
is required for substant 
Holton v. Holton, 121 U 
(1952). 
Cited in Howard v. He 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2C 
§§ 85, 86. 
Rule 2. One f 
There shall be 
Compiler's Notes. -
to Rule 2. F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. 
23. 
Consolidation of act: 
trial, Rule 42(a). 
AN 
Forms of action. 
—Common-law nam< 
—Defective answer. 
Law and equity. 
—Acceleration claus 
—Equitable defense* 
—Relief granted. 
Cited. 
Forms of action. 
—Common-law na 
The common-law 
ous actions or rem 
practical force or efi 
is called upon to giv 
ute. O'Neill v. San 
Utah 475, 114 P. 
—Defective answ 
The abolition of 
ings did not cure t 
plaintiff could not t 
1 Utah 28 (1876). 
Law and equity. 
Pursuant to thi 
may be applied in 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at place of abode," or similar terms referring to 
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes 
352. relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
C.J.S. — 7 C J.S. Attorney and Client § 15; Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=> 
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413. 90; Pleading *=> 331 to 338. 
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
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instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
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considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal contempt. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facts by jury. 
Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
147 
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
eree's order to participate in appeal secured by specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
Power of successor or substituted master or
 f
W h a t a r e
 "exceptional conditions" justifying 
r J J • • * J . reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on I A L R Fed 922 
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
 K e y N u m b e r s . _ E q u i t v « , 3 9 3 t o 3 9 5 > 4 0 1 j 
1 0 7 9
- 404 to 406; Reference «=> 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99 
Referee's failure to file report within time et seq. 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
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whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), UtahRApp.P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b). 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
§ 49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award. 
—Depositions. 
—Discretionary. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
—Attorney's fee award. 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
—Review of finality. 
—Separate claim. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality. 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Specific performance request. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited. 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Fidelity National Title Ins., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
>•*'-•' * -nan 
C . ' *Oourt 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 910329-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed April 15, 1992, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this vu' day of April, 1992 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary T / Noonan 
Clerk^bf t h e Court 
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IN THE 
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS 
Robert J. DeBRY and Joan DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 910329-CA 
FILED: March 18,1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
ATTORNEYS: 
Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellants 
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and 
Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs, Robert 
J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (DeBrys), against 
defendant Fidelity 'National Title Insurance 
Company (Fidelity). The summary judgment 
was certified by the trial court for appeal 
pursuant.to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The underlying action, which inv-
olves multiple parties and multiple causes of 
action,1 stems from DeBrys' purchase of an 
office building. As a threshold matter, Fidelity 
claims that notice of appeal was not timely 
filed,' and therefore/ this appeal should be 
dismissed. Because timely notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional, Armstrong Rubber Co. v. 
Bast/an, 657 P.2d 4346, 1348 (Utah 1983); 
Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 
1983), we must first determine whether 
DeBrys' notice of appeal was timely. 
On March 28, 1990, after DeBrys and Fid-
elity presented oral argument, the trial court 
granted Fidelity's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court directed Fidelity to prepare 
and submit to the court proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in 
conformity with the court's ruling. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
On April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered 
to DeBrys' counsel a copy of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and jud-
gment. All other counsel were served by mail 
on April 25, 1990. After allowing the five-
day objections period to run, as specified in 
ional Title Ins. Co. 
lv. Rep. 31 ~ 51 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration,2 Fidelity submitted the prop-
osed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment to the trial court on May 2, 1990. 
That same day, the trial court signed and the 
clerk of the court entered the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment. 
On May 7, 1990, five days after entry of 
judgment, DeBrys filed a document entitled 
'Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law." In the document, DeBrys objected to 
various findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and argued that specific additional findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should be made by 
the trial court. On May 22, 1990, DeBrys filed 
a notice of appeal 'from the order ... granting 
summary judgment ... entered ... on May 2, 
1990." 
On November 16, 1990, Fidelity mailed to 
DeBrys' counsel a copy of a proposed order 
denying DeBrys' objections and additions to 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The proposed order characterized 
DeBrys' objections and additions as a motion 
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3 DeBrys did not object to the 
proposed order. Thereafter, on December 11, 
1990, the trial court signed the order expressly 
construing DeBrys' objections and additions 
as a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule 
52(b). The court's order, a copy of which had 
been previously mailed to DeBrys' counsel on 
November 16, 1990, stated, "IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs^ motion pursuant 
to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law be and is hereby denied/ 
DeBrys did not file a notice of appeal after the 
court's December 11, 1990, order, nor did 
they object to the order until some ten months 
later on October 21, 1991, when they filed a 
motion to amend pursuant to Rule 60, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. After oral argument, 
the trial court denied the motion to amend.4 
DeBrys argue that their document concer-
ning objections and additions to proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law was 
not a Rule 52(b) motion and that the trial 
court erred in construing it as such.5 In dete-
rmining whether the court properly characte-
rized DeBrys' document, we look to the doc-
ument's substance rather than its caption. See 
Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-48 (citing Howard 
v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, ~ 356 
P.2d 275, 276 (I960)); Gallardo v. Botindcr, 
800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). 
The court's conclusion that DeBrys' docu-
ment constituted a Rule 52(b) motion is legal 
in nature; thus, it is accorded no particular 
deference * and reviewed for correctness. 
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v. 
Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 
1988); but see Valcnzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521 
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P.2d 1287, 1288-89 (Colo. a . App. 1974) 
(reviewing for "abuse of discretion" trial 
court's construction of motion to vacate as 
motion to amend under Rule 59(e)). 
DeBrys insist that their document concer-
ning objections and additions to findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should not have 
been construed as a Rule 52(b) motion because 
it did not constitute a "motion" per se> They 
reason that because their document was an 
objection and not a post-judgment motion, 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) does 
not apply, and that their notice of appeal was 
valid and that hence this court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal.7 
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion 
filed within ten days of the entry of judgment 
that questions the correctness of the court's 
findings and conclusions is properly treated as 
a post-judgment motion under either Rules 
52(b) or 59(e).« Armstrong. 657 P.2d at 1347-
48; Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Vreeken v. 
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1983). The 
substance of a motion, not its caption, is 
controlling.* See Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1348; 
Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817. In the instant case, 
DeBrys' motion in substance requested the 
trial court to amend and make additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a 
request recognized by Rule 52(b). Further-
more, DeBrys' motion was timely inasmuch as 
it was filed five days after entry of judgment.1* 
Based on the circumstances and the subst-
ance of DeBrys' motion, the trial court did 
not err in disposing of it as a post-judgment 
motion pursuant to Rule 52(b).11 
Moreover, because the trial court, under 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, can still alter or amend the judg-
ment, amend its findings, or make additional 
findings, a notice of appeal is of no effect if 
filed prior to the disposition of a post-
judgment motion under any of these rules. "A 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon this court." Tran-
samerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); accord 
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); U-M Invs. v. Ray, 
658 P.2d 1186, J186-87 (Utah 1982) (per 
curiam). Once a timely post-judgment 
motion is made pursuant to one of these rules, 
to permit an appeal would be an affront to 
judicial economy inasmuch as the very 
purpose of such a motion is to allow a trial 
court to correct its own errors, thus avoiding 
needless appeals. Cf. U-M lnvs., 658 P.2d at 
1187 (recognizing that the requirement of 
filing a notice of appeal after disposition of a 
post-judgment motion "may assist in disco-
uraging delay in the judicial process"); 9 
James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice 204.12[1], at 4-68, 4-69 & n.5 (2d 
ed. 1991) (stating that "[t]he very purpose of 
such [post-judgment] motions is to permit 
the trial court to correct its own errors, and 
thus avoid needless appeals"). 
In the instant case, summary judgment was 
entered on May 2, 1990. DeBrys filed their 
Rule 52(b) motion on May 7, 1990, and their 
notice of appeal on May 22, 1990. The trial 
court denied DeBrys' Rule 52(b) motion on 
December 11, 1990. No further appeal was 
filed. As previously noted, Utah Rule of 
AppeDate Procedure 4(b) requires the filing of 
a new notice of appeal within the prescribed 
time after entry of the trial court's order dis-
posing of a Rule 52(b) post-judgment 
motion. Because DeBrys failed to file a notice 
of appeal after the court denied their post-
judgment motion, we are without jurisdiction 
and the appeal is dismissed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Appeals involving other parties in this action are 
now before this court. 
2. Rule 4-504(2) provides that "[cjopies of the 
proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be 
served upon opposing counsel before being prese-
nted to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be sub-
mitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after service/ 
3. Rule 52(b) provides in relevant part that *[u]pon 
motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings 
or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly." 
4. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend is 
the subject of a separate notice of appeal filed on 
January 28,1992. 
5. In addition, DeBrys contend that the court erred 
by prematurely signing the findings of fact, concl-
usions of law, and judgment before the time for 
objections had run pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. DeBrys' 
counsel was served with a copy of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment 
on April 24, 1990, and all other counsel were served 
by mail on April 25, 1990. This service by mail, they 
claim, added three days to their five-day objections 
period of Rule 4-504(2), and therefore, all counsel 
had until May 7, 1990, to file their objections. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e). 
DeBrys' argument is without merit. They were 
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment on April 24, 1990. 
Pursuant to the five-day objections period of Rule 
4-504(2), excluding the intermediate Saturday and 
Sunday as required by Rule 6(a), DeBrys* objections 
were due May 1, 1990. On May 2, 1990, the trial 
court signed and the clerk of the court entered the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. 
Although the five-day objections period for 
other counsel had not yet run, inasmuch as they 
were served by mail on April 25, 1990, the court's 
apparent oversight is inconsequential for two 
reasons. First, no other parties had an interest in 
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nor did they oppose Fidelity* s motion for summary 
judgment. Second, no objections were filed by other 
counsel, nor have other counsel complained that 
they should have been allowed to file objections. 
6. A motion is an application made to the court for 
the purpose of obtaining a ruling or order directing 
some act to be done in favor of the applicant. Elliot 
v. Elliot. 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
7. Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is tiled in the trial 
court by any party ... under Rule 52(b) 
to amend or make additional findings of 
fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted ... the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying ... such motion. A 
notice of appeal filed before the dispo-
sition of any of the above motions shall 
have no effect. A new notice of appeal 
must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of 
the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. 
8. Rule 59(e) provides that "(a] motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 
10 days after entry of the judgment. * 
9. This is consistent with the requirement that the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally const-
rued. Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). 
10. Additional reasons support the trial court's 
construction of DeBrys' motion as a Rule 52(b) post-
judgment motion. After filing then- motion, DeBrys 
made no attempt to withdraw the motion, nor did 
they attempt to communicate to the trial court that 
it was not a post-judgment motion. Despite their 
knowledge that judgment had been entered five days 
prior to the filing of their motion, DeBrys proce-
eded to file a notice of appeal. Moreover, by recei-
ving a copy of the proposed order almost a month 
before the trial court's order disposing of their 
motion* DeBrys were on notice that the court would 
construe their motion as a Rule 52(b) post-
judgment motion. 
11. The instant case is readily distinguishable from 
Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1991), where the Utah Supreme Court held that 
motions for entry of findings, pursuant to Rule 
52(a) or (b), filed after a trial court's granting of 
summary judgment without findings of fact, does 
not toll the time for appeal. Id. at 321-23. In 
contrast, the trial court in the case at bar sua sponte 
requested and signed findings of fact and conclus-
ions of law after granting Fidelity's motion for 
summary judgment. Moreover, DeBrys* post-
judgment motion, in contrast with that filed in Ncer-
ings, did not request an entry of findings; 
rather it requested the trial court to amend and 
make additional findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Myrne M. COLLIER, as personal 
representative of the Estate of James A. 
Collier, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kerry M. HEINZ and Southwest Virginia 
Shopping Center Associates, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
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FILED: March 19, 1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
ATTORNEYS: 
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Randy S. Feil, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Heinz appeals the trial court's 
judgment interpreting a settlement agreement 
in favor of plaintiff, the personal representa-
tive of the Estate of James A. Collier. Heinz 
also appeals the trial court's award of atto-
rney fees to the estate. We affirm the trial 
court's interpretation of the settlement agre-
ement and reverse the award of attorney fees. 
FACTS 
Defendant Heinz and James Collier were 
business partners in a number of general and 
limited partnerships. Upon Collier's death, 
Heinz and some of these partnerships brought 
claims against Collier's estate relating to the 
partnership agreements. Similarly, the estate 
filed claims against Heinz and many of the 
partnerships. 
On February 12, 1988, after months of 
negotiations, the estate and Heinz, both rep-
resented by counsel, entered into a settlement 
agreement. In this agreement, Heinz gave up 
certain rights and claims against the estate in 
consideration for the estate's release of some 
of its rights and claims against Heinz. Subse-
quent to this agreement, a dispute arose over 
the rights of Heinz and the estate concerning 
the distribution of assets from one of their 
dissolved partnerships. Under the settlement 
agreement, the estate maintained a fifty 
percent general partnership interest in that 
partnership. The trial court held that the lan-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DE3RY, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., ] 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS 
AND ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. C86-553 
) JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Plaintiffs submit the following objections and 
additions to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted by defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. 
GENERAL OBJECTION TO 
PROP05ED FINDINGS Or FACT 
Findings of fact are unnecessary to support the 
granting of summary judgment. Mountain States v. Atkin, Wright s 
^ t r ^ — ^ 
Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. All that is required in this case is 
that the court enter an order declaring its findings that because 
it holds as a matter of law there were no disputed facts on 
material issues, judgment was rendered for defendant. 
There is an extensive record in this case. As long as 
the argument and issues have been raised before this Court, the 
plaintiffs should be allowed, on appeal, to use any portion of 
the record which supports their position. 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Without waiving the General Objection just mentioned, 
the plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact. By making these specific objections, 
the plaintiffs do not intend to resubmit or reargue their 
:rposition to Fidelity's Motion. The plaintiffs do, however, 
*-ant to identify these issues which they contend are not properly 
submitted as findings and/or are disputed in the record. 
1. Regarding finding number 1, the plaintiffs object 
to the language "under construction" on the third line. The fact 
is the building was represented to be substantially completed and 
a temoorary certificate of occupancy was produced at closing to 
2 
support the claim that with the exception of a few minor items 
set forth on said certificate, the building was completed. 
Plaintiffs never intended and did not believe they were buying a 
building which was "under construction." 
2. With respect to finding number 2, the comments to 
number 1 above would apply. 
3. With respect to finding number 4, plaintiffs 
object to the characterization by defendant as to what the 
closing statement says. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the 
language must be read together with the language requiring 
approval*of plaintiffs of any dispersals. The specific language 
quoted is subject to the approval requirement. 
4. Plaintiffs object to finding number 5 on the 
grounds the court made no findings at the hearing regarding the 
manner or method of disbursement. 
5. With respect to paragraph 8, plaintiffs object to 
the characterization of the escrow agreements' meaning. The 
court made no findings thereon and the document speaks for 
itself. 
5. With respect to paragraph 10, plaintiffs object to 
the characterization of the letter which speaks for itself. 
Furthermore, the loan proceeds at that point belonged to DeErys 
and such finding should be noted. 
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7. There is a disputed fact issue as to the alleged 
intent of the Woodbury escrow instructions which should be noted 
in the findings. 
8. With respect to paragraph 12(b), it was and is the 
position of plaintiffs that the agreement not to disperse was 
both oral and in writing and the writing is evidenced by the 
language of the closing statement. 
9. With respect to paragraph 12(c), the language 
should show that plaintiffs' claims included the negligent 
disbursal of the escrowed monies. 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The proposed Conclusions of Law contain unnecessary and 
inappropriate restatement of the facts upon which the Conclusions 
are based. Conclusions of law should simply set forth the 
position of the Court as to the law applicable to the facts of 
the case. 
1. Conclusions of law numbered 3 and 4 are mixed 
conclusions. The legal conclusion is "the content is not 
ambiguous." 
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2. A specific finding should be included holding that 
S 31A-23-308 does not apply to losses caused by negligence as 
this finding was specifically made by the Court. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DE3RY & ASSOCIATES 
Attornevs for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY 
Plaintiff, 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. al., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual 
et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company ("Fidelity") for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert 
and Joan DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") came on for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 28, 1990, at of 1:00 
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p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding. 
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates. Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale 
and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to 
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully 
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased 
from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was 
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed 
is referred to herein as the "Property"). 
2. While the Building was still under construction, 
DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale. 
3. DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title & Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title") , a local title company, for the closing (the 
"Closing"). At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of 
closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents"). 
4. One of the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and 
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Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated 
December 13, 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
and made a part hereof) . Line 48 of the Closing Statement provided 
for payment of $79,247.16 to be made to Cascade at the Closing. 
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an 
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on 
the Building (the "Subcontractors"). The Closing Statement 
specifically stated: 
The undersigned Buyer [DeBrys] and Seller 
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing 
statement and authorize Utah Title & Abstract 
Company, to complete the transaction in 
accordance herewith. All instruments may 
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed, 
[emphasis added]. 
5. Pursuant to DeBrys1 and Cascade's Closing Statement, 
Utah Title disbursed the $143,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but 
only $57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $21,923.82 was 
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property 
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization. These amounts 
were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-Woodbury"). 
6. As a further part of the Closing, DeBrys also 
executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust deed on the 
Property in the amount of $62,500.00, representing the balance of 
the purchase price for the Building and Property to be paid by 
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DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The 
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written 
Closing Statement at line 7. 
7. DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and 
Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded. 
8. In connection with the Closing, DeBry, Cascade, and 
Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger 
Agreement" (DeBrys1 Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted by 
counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part 
hereof). Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work 
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and 
although "various issues concerning the construction remain 
unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement 
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily 
supplied by Seller." 
9. DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys' Escrow 
Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed would be escrowed with Utah 
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the 
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for 
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues. DeBrys' Escrow 
Agreement specifically provided 
that the amount of increase in allowances, 
the decrease in the charge of any extras, the 
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increase in any credits, and the amount paid 
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is 
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic,1 
to perform which the parties agree to or which 
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are 
entitled tof shall be deducted from the 
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note 
rthe Note! and Trust Deed. Until the disputes 
which exists rsic.] concerning allowances, 
extras, credits and unfinished work are 
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise, 
Buyers may also deduct all funds owed it 
rsic.] under the warranty described in 
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for work-
manship and materials] and Seller's obli-
gation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's 
indemnification against mechanic's liens] 
from the amounts owed under the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added]. 
10. By letter dated December 16, 1985 (three days 
after the date of the signed Closing Statement) , Mr. Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written 
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury 
(the "Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof). Richards-
Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property 
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds on the 
title" of the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a 
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was 
expressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions 
to use Richards-Woodbury's loan proceeds to clear those 
encumbrances and "clouds on title." 
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11. The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further 
stated: 
After you have determined that all the liens 
and clouds on the property [the Property] 
have been satisfied and removed and that the 
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above 
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing 
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be 
a first lien, vou may disburse the remaining 
funds from the check described in paragraph 
8. above [the $485,973.35 check representing 
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodburyfs 
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises 
[emphasis added]. 
In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury 
did not intend by the words "clouds on the property*1 to refer to 
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license or building 
permit to construct the Building. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having or not 
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically 
did not refer to any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title. 
12. DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and others 
for the alleged faulty construction of the Building. DeBrys named 
Utah Title as one of many defendants and asserted the following 
claims against Utah Title: 
a. That Cascade did not have a contractor's 
license or building permit to construct the Building. DeBrys 
claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the 
Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, 
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that 
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized 
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should not have disbursed to 
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and 
building permit. 
b. That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse 
any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
c. That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for 
allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not 
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
13. Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended 
their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their 
Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this 
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter of 
Utah Title for the purpose of issuing title policies, and that 
pursuant to §31A-23-308, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), Fidelity is 
liable for Utah Title's alleged misconduct. §31A-23-308 states, in 
relevant part: 
Any title company represented by one or more 
title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to others dealing with the 
title insurance agents for the receipt and 
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disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all those transactions 
where a commitment or binder for or policy 
or contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance 
company has been issued or distributed. 
14. After Fidelity was brought into this action as a 
party Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 
proceeding is still pending. 
15. Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. The DeBrys were 
also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some 
of the Closing Documents, including DeBry's Escrow Agreement. 
16. Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, the 
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. Any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade did not create a cloud on the title to the 
Property. 
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2. Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah 
Title to determine whether Cascade had a contractor's license or a 
building permit. 
3. There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents, 
including without limitation in the Closing Statement or DeBrys1 
Escrow Agreement. If there were any ambiguities in DeBrys1 Escrow 
Agreement, they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the 
document. 
4. The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with 
respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified, 
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents 
themselves without the need for any parol evidence. 
5. The Closing Documents authorized immediate 
disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the 
Closing Statement) and the balance owing to Seller (line 48 of the 
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys. The oral 
agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written 
Closing Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the 
introduction of any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements. 
6. The December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury Escrow 
Instructions were intended to protect someone other than DeBrys. 
DeBrys are not third-party beneficiaries of the December 16, 1985 
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to 
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assert any alleged violation of those instructions. 
7. There was no violation of the Closing Documents by 
Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah 
Title in connection with the Closing. 
8. Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under §31A-23-308, 
Utah Code Annotated. Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to 
DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement 
regarding the Property. 
9. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law, 
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeBrys should be 
granted. 
10. As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
» Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is 
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor. 
Dated this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
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OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
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-11-
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thrugood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Del Bartel 
P. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrimac Court 
Vallejo, California 94859 
Stanley Postma 
2571 South 75 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Richard Carling 
SHEARER & CARLING 
200 South Main Street, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glen Roberts 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER 
2677 Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Paul Maughan 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Craig Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Van Ellsworth 
1414 Laburnum Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
Darwin C. Hansen 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
136 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-12-
EXHIBI 
CERTIFICATE 0? gAND-DELIVERY 
J hereby certify that a true and correct r.:?" nf 
the foregoing F^NIlTMf^ n' nnfiniEiPirrED MA'l ...A.*--, J ML, I J iJui CONCLUSIONS 
II « i UN FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this ^ - V a " '" * •', "-0, 
W W • 
E d w a r d I". \ ? e l l s 
4,2 52 "South TOO E a s t 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , UT S41C7 
CERTIFICATE OF KAIIINi 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t 2, true. zr,z 
Cr'WirV —"""^ irrVT'V^  **ac- —-a : " / 1 «' 1 " - •" "• ' 1 •'. r "-
' ^ V ^ 1 > T V I C V /-% rr» — « 1 f "7 "*» 7; 
Thcsas Grisiey 
Roy G. HasIan 
PARSONS, 1 — IE a LATIMER 
#IS5 So , •, ,«":i 2 Street , * ' 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Barrel 
?. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thrugood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Del 3artel 
P. 0. 3cx 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrinac Court 
Vallejo, California 94859 
Stanley ?ost~a 
2571 South 7 5 west 
3ountiful, Utah 84 010 
Richard Carling 
SHEARER cc CARLING 
2 00 South Main Street, #100 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
Glen Roberts 
WOODBURY, 3ETTILYCN £ KESLER 
2577 Parleyfs Kay 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Paul Maughan 
SALT. LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 3 00 South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Craig Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Van Ellsworth 
1414 Laburnun Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
5 05 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 8 4 010 
Darvin C. Hansen 
MORGAN a HANSEN 
13 6 South Main, 8th Elocr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
EXHIB: 
L" •-
Robert. J. Dale, No. 080'8 
Lynn C. McMurray, No. 2213 
Attorneys for Fidelity Nations 1 
Title Insurance Company and 
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
Canada Life Assurance Company 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801 ) 532-5125 
«WJL1.--
IS THE THIRD JUDICIAL" DISTRICT COURT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DEBPY AND JOAN DESR^  
i ! 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES 
pa.rt.ne: 
CANADA 
vs. 
R03ERT 
e- al. 
rsn: 
LI: 
u • 
t 
Defend.:, 
FS ASSUR 
I- Id.,1",: i 
DEBRY, 
Defence 
., i 
1 
ANCZ 
an i 
.nis. 
COMPANY,: 
ncivld.ua] : 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Civil Nc. C36-553 
The Motion cf Defendant Fidel: :v Na-:?.-,: 
Ccir.pa-v ("7: ,\,(•••]. "i , u. u'.'.,^ ', s^..:^t 
and J sari Deijyy (collectively, "DeBrys") cane en f 
the ahsve-er.~it.Ied court, on Wednesday >«.,..-i. • • ? 
. 1 ^ in : : . i1 is I\c berr 
cr hesr inq befcre 
p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding. 
De3rys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry « 
Associates. Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale 
and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to 
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully 
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FTKDINGS 0? UNDISPUTED MATERIA FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased 
from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was 
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed 
is referred to herein as the "Property"). 
2. While the Building was still under consrruc-icn, 
DeSrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale. 
2. DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title £ Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the 
"Closing"). At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of 
closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents"). 
4. One cf the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and 
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C*rc.?*de w..i • ;s closing statement, (the "C'losina St;?,*; eimr; ' :!:i(:ed 
D'",",;esir>er 12IIP 2 9 a , r | ,„i, "T"",1" ..)"• ?h i :li i::« attached hereto as Exhibit A 
. ,i^ c. a, part ^ r ^ / i " ' ,,.7,^  VIS zt "t^e Closing St^t.e^ert. tr?Ari;itvi 
ior p ayment of $79,247 .16 to !'• * inad* * : "*:• \"' ::*c'• ;" ' ' , , , i , '. Losmg, 
'; n< ••!• IJJ",'"i"1., ::-"iiatement provided for the payment of an 
•*'.. i-mated amount of $14 3,092.23 to subcontractors who had worVcS 
tine Building (the ,,fSubcontract::rnr " -. "IMUI L : oL-.n:? ;jtatene:it 
specif"* r:r» ' i .•-'. '•.".! -
The undersigned 3uyer [DeBrys] and Seller 
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing 
statement and authorize Utah Title « kbszzi:". 
Company., to complete the transaction In 
accordance herewith. All instruments r.a11" 
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed. 
[emphasis added], 
5. Pursuant to DeBrys' and Cascade's Closing Statement, 
Utah Title disbursed *"he S K ^ . O ^ : ?ri i i iiij^^nuractors, L'JT 
c ni,, rr- -» -,:a:e ueciusa "che remaining ?ri,523*sr was 
vitnrield iron Cascade :; ;» pr>" uff encumbrances r *i '" * ••. "ip^ -.y 
pursuant t:: cascade's tr:"*- » n -•-:t'::
 ta(. „icn. These amounts 
ver ' ^ ; *" - •*.>•.'.. . !
 M I : --- 1 -i. .i proceeds obtained by DeBrys from 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Pianards-Woor.^"' i"'). 
6. As a furr^ip ' • losing, DeBrys clso 
n^pi , i-:i':, ' i ,e payable to Cascade, secured by a trust. ^e«l cr the 
Prcmertv 1' . ne amount cf $62,5 ?0 00 re?TPSf'n" , ,..:!.d-... c: 
DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The 
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written 
Closing Statement at line 7. 
7. DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and 
Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded. 
8. In connection with the Closing, De3ry, Cascade, and 
Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger 
Agreement" (De3rys* Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted by 
counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and made a part 
hereof) . Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work 
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and 
although "various issues concerning the construction remain 
unresolved," De3rys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement 
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily 
sumo^ied bv Seller*" 
9. DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys' Escrow 
Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed would be escrowed with Utah 
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the 
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for 
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues. DeBrys1 Escrow 
Agreement specifically provided 
that the amount cf increase in allowances, 
the decrease in the charge cf any extras, the 
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£ n c r e a s e. £n aily creciits; .and the amount paid 
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is 
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic,1 
to perform which the parties agree to or whicn 
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are 
entitled tcf shall be deducted from the 
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note 
rthe Notel and Trust Deed, Until the disputes 
which exists fsic,] concerning allowances, 
extras, credits and unfinished work are 
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise, 
3uvers mav also deduct all funds owed -it 
rsic.] under the warranty described in 
paragraph 2 [ Cascade ls warranty for work-
manship and "materials] and Seller's obli-
gation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's 
indemnification against mechanic's liens] 
from the amounts owed under the Promissory 
Note and•Trust Deed [emphasis added]. 
10 „ Dv 1 P ^ I : : " ^ / v j I ecesiLtir '" \, , "„ >• : {'",..i;rse ^ays 
a f t e r t h e d a t e of t h e s i g n e d C los ing S t a t e m e n t ) , Mr. J e f f r e y K. 
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , a t t o r n e y for R icha rds -Voodbur" ' z?n •- v • -••-•i 
esi • "'u i r s J • 'ji:',, / , / , . , i i "i on b e n a i : c : . - l ienarcs- woocbury 
( t h e ' ' R i c h a r d s - W o o d b u r y Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s ; l l -j i: •.: y c •: which i s 
a t t a c h e d h e r e t o PIT. E x h i b i t C an i mac.p. -J p . • ',•.:-»••-fi •.:,„,•
 b„-
Woonbu-'v t h e . e : ,.;ii:l'Lr,uctea Ut-^L T-t .G ,. .. u i e a r from t n e P r o p e r t y 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d l i e n s , encumbrances , and " c l o u d s on t h e 
t i t l e " ct* *" n9 ? r c D e r * v 1 " < - 7 ; . i " ' " n * ' " ;ir<" "Tn V I 
", H i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y ( t h e "Commitment" l i taa ' l i t i s was 
e x p r e s s l y a u t h o r i z e d n t h e Richards -Wocdbury Escrow "" i n s t r u c t i o n s 
t o u s e R: rh^*'" m Vn • ; • i , n-ee... . . c - e a r t h o s e 
e n c u m b r a n c e s a n a " c i o u u s en t i t . e . " 
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11. The Richards -Woodbury Escrow Instructions further 
stated: 
After you have determined that all the liens 
and clouds on the property [the Property] 
have been satisfied and removed and that the 
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above 
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing 
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be 
a first lien, vou nav disburse the remaining 
funds from the check described in oaracraoh 
8. above [the $485,973.25 check representing 
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodbury's 
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises 
[emphasis added]. 
In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury 
did not intend bv the words "clouds on the orooertv" to refer to 
Cascadefs allegedly not having a contractor's license or building 
permit to construe- the 3uilding. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascadefs having cr net 
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically 
did not refer to any lack cf a contractor's license cr building 
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the ?rcoertvfs title. 
12. DeSrvs filed this action acair.st Cascade and ethers 
for the alleced faultv construction cf the Buildinc. DeErys named 
Utah Title as one cf many defendants and asserted the following 
claims acainst Utah Title: 
a. That Cascade did not have a contractor's 
license cr buildinc oermit to construct the Building. DeErys 
claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the 
Property pursuant *• 'ii . ;L,K it., w -ciu;., Escrow Ins-tractions, 
, ii' .a^j \ i jei'ieixciaries of Miose escrow instructions, and tb.st 
even though the Closing Statement they ri cried n .-«•*• nt t( | i.jjjjrized 
Utah Title r? d i :iN. - ' ,li , I a . iiuuici i.-t. have disbursed to 
u,.>L,du<r l;>ecause Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and 
building pernit. 
a. x i ' ]i ..Lie orally agreed not to disburse 
a::y_;unos to the seller (Cascade) i *'he Subcontractors i;:," "li h.he 
Building was completed and .,jrrp P* ' i:i.:s. 
c. That Utah Title is liable to De3rys fcr 
allegedly negligently misrepresenting t? Dr.E:-,Tr» : 
disburse anv fun,,:, • ' i SL.ILI _nu t.ai: Dubcuntractors i::"t the 
bu. ... .""j WUL w^npleteu ana approved by SeBr/s. 
13, Since the fiiinc ~f tr, • ,. ." " " " H:i:mij LJ . LI amended 
"j-11,:' ",:ssl' v ,!.  ..an^ .ty <is a party Defendant,. In their 
i,. :; /jaencei Complaint, whicn is the governing cor.tlair 
action
 r De3rvs alleged that r 'if?1 ' - L '.  11» uncervrnei cf 
Utan T **" » „-rpcse c: .ssuing title policies, ^nd tl^r 
pursuant ::, <, 21A-12-3 03
 r Utah Code Annotated fire."*- " "' ' 
liable for Utah Title's al'ecp' r r>'':r • i v..-—"-^ --Ud states, in 
Any title company represented - •_ :t ; -.^ 
title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to ctners dealing vitn the 
title insurance acents for tne receirt and 
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all those transactions 
where a commitment or binder for or policy 
or contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance 
commany has been issued or distributed. 
14. After Fidelity was brought into this action as a 
parry Defendant by De3rys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 
proceeding is still pending. 
15. Robert DeBry was at ail times relevant an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. The De3rys were 
also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some 
of the Closing Documents, including De3ryfs Escrow Agreement. 
IS. Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action. 
CONCLUSIONS O? LA^ 
Based en the foregoing undisputed material facts, the 
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. Any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade did net create a cloud en the title to the 
Prooertv. 
2. Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah 
Title to determine whether Cascade had a-contractor's license or a 
building permit. 
3. There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents, 
including without limitation i: the Closing Statement or DeBrys1 
Escrow Agreement. If there were any ambiguities in De3rys' Escrow 
Agreement, they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the 
document. 
4. The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with 
respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified, 
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents 
themselves without the need for any parol evidence. 
5. The Closing Documents authorized immediate 
disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the 
•Closing Statement) and the balance owing IO Seller (line 43 of the 
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys. The oral 
agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent: with the written 
Closing Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the 
introduction cf any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements. 
6. The December 15, 19S5 Richards-Woodbury Escrow-
Instructions were intended to protect someone other than De3rys. 
DeBrys are not third-party benefioiaries of the December 15, 1985 
Richards-wccdbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to 
assert any alleged violation of those instructions. 
7. There was no violation of the Closing Documents by 
Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah 
Title in connection with the Closing. 
8. Fidelity is not liable to De3rys under §3lA-23-3 08, 
Utah Code Annotated. Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to 
DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement 
regarding the Property, 
9. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law, 
and Fidelity's Motion fcr Summary Judgment against De3rys should be 
granted. 
10. As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there is no just reason fcr delay, and Fidelity is 
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor. 
EXHIBIT H 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DS3RY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 107 
Telephone: (001) 252-8S15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 0? ' 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE 
:HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC: 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT.J. DEBRY and JOAN DE3RY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE CO., et ai . , 
Defendants. 
OeBry, 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil Nc. CSS-553 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
n.? u « iT.w5 v. 
•^•x c "* "-" ^ *" * 
is hereby given tnat Rooert J. DeBry and Joan 
:s herein na:ned, hereby appeal to the Supreme 
.te cf **cah ~~OTu the order cf the District Cou*"t 
• judgment in favor cf Fidelity National Title 
ntered herein on May 2, 1990 and certified by the 
a final order pursuant to ?.uie 54(b) cf the 
F.ules cf Civil Procedure on Mav 2, 1990 
DATED this /JjA cav of !'.av, 1990. 
Attomevs for Plaintiff 
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0 
^ *-% ^ *•* * f 
CERTIFICATE 0? MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE 0? APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, on the 
^?JD cay of Kay, 1990, to the following: 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P.O. Box 7234 
Hurray, UT 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurcooc 
4435 South 700 East #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Dei Bartel 
P.O. Box 7234 
Murray, UT • G4107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East =300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
r,£o Allen Bartel 
110 Merrimac Court 
Vaiiejo, CA 94582 
Glen Roberts 
2 5 77 Parley's Way 
Stanley Pcstr.a 
2571 Scruth 7 3 West 
Bountiful, UT S-.CiO 
Lynn KcMurray 
425 East 500*South #30 
c^i- 'a'/o r:t*v u,n h.:**'1 
Robert Huches 
50 West 300 South #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
12 4 5 East Brickyard Rd. =500 
Salt Lake City,"uT S4105 
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
185 South State #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
D. Kichael Nielsen 
505 South Kain Street 
Bountiful, UT 84 010 
Darwin C Hansen 
135 South Kain, Eichth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT* 84101 
Craic Peterson 
425 Scutn 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Van Ellsworth 
14 14 Laburnum Street 
McLean, VA 22101 
Ken Bartel 
,i:oo C lav Star Rd 
o 
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per *, « •' :*< 
Lynn C. McMurray, #2213 
McKURRAY, McKURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
ROBERT J. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRYf 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. al., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO 
AMEND PROPOSED FINDINGS CF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C36-553 
Judge Pat B. 3rian 
On Wednesday, March 28, 1990, the Court heard and granted 
the notion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
for surjnary judgment against Plaintiffs Rcbert and Jean DeBry 
Thereafter, en May 2, 199 0, the Court entered its Findings of 
FIDE-DEE.Orw/lCM/effi 
Undisputed Material Facts and Conclusions of Lav on Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Company's Motion for summary .Judgment) 
and its Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Company Against Plaintiffs Robert J, DeBry and 
Joan De3ry. Thereafter, on May 4, 1990, Plaintiff submitted 
Plaintiff's Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Lav. No party having requested oral argument, 
and the Court being fully and duly informed in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 motion pursuant to 
Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the proposed 
Findincs of Fact and Conclusions pi. Law be and is herebv denied. 
DATED this // day o^November, 1990, 
BY THE COURT: ^—\ 
P£r 5. Brian, 
District Judge 
Attorneys for Defendant 
I hereby certify that Z mailed a copy cf the foregoing Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Objections and Motion to Amend Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions cf Lav, first-Cj.ass postage 
thereon fully prepaid this 11/°^ day cf November, 199 0, to: 
clD5-DE5.CRD/LCu7e^ - 2 -
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Kaslam 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
#185 So. State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Del 3artel 
P. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrinac Court 
Vailejo, California 94859 
Stanley Postsia 
2571 South 7 5 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Richard Carling 
SKU-^ZR « CARLING 
2650 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glen Roberts 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON * KESLER 
2 677 Parley1s Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Edward T. Weils 
ROBERT J. DeBRY * ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 Eas~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
?!DE-CEB.C?.3/LCM/effl 
Curtis J. Drake 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Paul Maughan 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COKNE, RAPPAPORT fie SEGAL 
P. O, Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84In7 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Craig Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Van Ellsworth 
1414* Laburnum Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Darwin C. Hansen 
MORGAN £ HANSEN 
13 6 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
f]^.r,'SL,{),, 
EXHIBIT J 
subjects addressed in the parol agreements. A finding of 
integration is, nonetheless, implicit in the trial court's 
Findings of Fact. 
5. Fidelity is not liable under S31A-23-308 for Utah 
Title's alleged negligent misrepresentation tort. 
That statute contains absolutely no language making an 
underwriter liable for the torts of its title insurance agents. 
DeBrys1 common law agency argument against Fidelity in its brief 
was not pleaded or argued below, is not supported in the record, 
is being raised for the first time on appeal, and is the subject 
of a totally separate lawsuit filed by DeBrys. Moreover, 
negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on an alleged 
misrepresentation of a "future event," as opposed to a 
representation of an existing material fact. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
1. THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AMD SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Two days after the Court below entered Summary Judgment in 
favor of Fidelity, DeBrys filed a motion to amend and make 
additions to the findings of fact. Before the district court 
entered its order denying their motion, DeBrys filed their only 
notice of appeal ever filed. Under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, DeBrys' notice of appeal has no effect: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court 
by any party . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new 
trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion . . . A notice of appeal filed before 
the disposition of any [such motion] shall 
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must 
be filed within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order of the trial 
court disposing of the motion as provided 
above [emphasis added]. 
On December 11, 1990, the trial court denied DeBrys1 motion 
in an order stating as follows in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 Motion 
pursuant to Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law be and is hereby 
denied. (R. 12917; App. Z). 
The 30 day period for filing DeBrys' Notice of Appeal thus began 
to run on December 11, 1990, and DeBrys1 prior May 22, 1990 
Notice of Appeal therefore was filed prematurely and was totally 
ineffective. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen. 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986), that a 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-judgment 
motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme 
Court. Also, in Anderson v. Schwendiman. 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) , this Court held that a post-judgment motion like this 
suspends the finality of the judgment, and that a notice of 
appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion by entry 
of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an 
appellate court. Because DeBrys filed their notice of appeal 
before obtaining a ruling on their proposed additions to the 
findings of fact, their notice of appeal was ineffective to 
confer jurisdiction on this Court, and this appeal therefore 
should be dismissed. 
2. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW ONLY THOSE CLAIMS RAISED IN DEBRYS9 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IGNORE THOSE ISSUES NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE IT. 
